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Abstract 
Over the last two decades the classical model of hierarchical and integrated government 
has been gradually replaced by a more horizontally structured and fragmented 
arrangement. A central aspect of this development in many countries has been a change 
in how regulatory activities are organized. Regulation based on central command and 
control from the top has been weakened in favor of more regulation by autonomous 
regulatory agencies. We discuss this development first by looking at concepts like the 
Regulatory State, regulation and agency, thereby drawing together the different strands 
of literature about regulation and agencies. Second, we describe the development and 
effects of the new regulatory model and review a number of empirical studies of reform 
processes and effects. Finally, we discuss how some of the main empirical features may 
be interpreted using various theoretical approaches such as the rational-economic, 
organizational-structural, and institutional perspectives. 
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Sammendrag 
I løpet av de siste 20 år har den tradisjonelle hierarkiske og integrerte statlige 
styringsmodellen gradvis blitt erstattet av en mer horisontalt strukturert og fragmentert 
modell. Et sentralt aspekt ved denne utviklingen i mange land har vært en endring i 
organiseringen av regulerende aktiviteter. Regulering basert på kommando og kontroll 
fra sentralt hold har blitt svekket til fordel fra regulering gjennom autonome 
tilsynsorganer. Et formål med dette notatet er å gi en oversikt over den internasjonale 
litteraturen på feltet ved å bringe sammen litteraturen om regulering og regulerings-
reformer på den ene siden og litteraturen om sentrale statlige «agencies» på den andre 
siden. Vi diskuterer denne utviklingen ved først å diskutere sentrale begreper som 
regulering, den regulerende stat, og sentrale semi-autonome myndigheter. Deretter 
beskriver vi utviklingen og effektene av den nye reguleringsmodellen og omtaler en 
rekke empiriske studier av reformprosesser og effekter i ulike land og sektorer. Endelig 
diskuteres hvordan en del av de viktigste empiriske trekkene kan fortolkes ved hjelp av 
ulike teoretiske tilnærminger slik som økonomisk-rasjonelle, organisasjons-strukturelle 
og institusjonelle perspektiver. Notatet avsluttes med noen forslag til videre forskning 
på dette feltet. 
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Introduction 
Over the last 20 years the classical hierarchical model of regulation by command and 
control from the top has been supplemented by greater delegation of this function to 
autonomous agencies. The new international regulatory orthodoxy, enhanced by the 
emergence of a universal reform model, holds that the creation of autonomous agencies 
will improve regulatory performance and efficiency without having negative side-effects 
on other values such as political control and democracy (Pollitt et al. 2004, Self 2000). 
We argue that this is a hypothesis and not an evidence-based fact and therefore needs to 
be examined through empirical studies. The causes and effects of this development in 
regulatory policy are still unclear.  
There is an increasing literature on central agencies as well as on regulation and 
regulatory reforms. Until now, however, the research on central agencies has been 
characterized by weak theoretical development, an absence of comparable data, little 
comparative analysis, and few empirical studies (Bouckaert and Peters 2004, Pollitt et al. 
2004). While there has recently been some improvement in the quality of this research, 
there is still much ground to cover. The literature on regulation is generally more 
advanced, but there has been little attempt to link the literature on regulation and 
regulatory reforms and that on autonomous central agencies. In this paper we will try to 
bring these two fields together by reviewing some of the main contributions in each of 
them. We will describe how regulatory and agency reforms are implemented in practice, 
and discuss some of their effects and implications based on different theoretical 
approaches. 
We will focus on the organizational side of regulatory change and more specifically 
on the establishment of autonomous regulatory agencies and their relationship with 
superior ministries, and political executives. The use of central agencies within the 
regulatory state represents only one instrument of regulatory policy. In practice 
regulatory policy is implemented using a mixture of different types of state regulations 
such as independent agencies, self-regulation, and command-and-control regulation 
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Hutter 2001). However, we will focus mainly on the 
development of the agency model as an intermediate form between the integrated 
hierarchical model and the more fragmented network model (Lægreid and Serigstad 
2004), leaving aside the broader field of norms, control mechanisms, controllers, and 
subjects of control. Labeled by some as the post-regulatory state (Scott 2004), this 
includes phenomena such as self-regulation, soft regulation of the open-method type, 
framework regulation, responsive regulation, governance, regulatory regimes, regulatory 
capitalism, and networks between public and private organizations (Scott 2003, 2004, 
Knill and Lenschow 2004, Levi-Faur 2005). 
We will first discuss central concepts such as the Regulatory State, regulation and 
agency. Second, we will describe and discuss the emergence of the Regulatory State and 
the agency form. Fourth, we will address some lessons and implications. Finally, we will 
discuss how different theoretical approaches such as rational, organizational-structural, 
and institutional perspectives can be used to interpret the processes and effects.  
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Some Main Concepts: The Regulatory 
State, Regulation and Agency 
The view is widespread that we live in the era of the Regulatory State (Majone 1994, 
1997, Loughlin and Scott 1997, MacGowan and Wallace 1996, Moran 2002, Lodge 
2001). The traditional sovereign state model with its command-and-control policy style, 
public ownership and nationalization, was appealing because it aimed to reconcile a 
variety of partly conflicting goals in a multifunctional state. In contrast, the goals of the 
Regulatory State are much narrower, namely to improve the efficiency of the economy, 
promote competition, and protect consumers and citizens. Other traditionally important 
considerations, such as democratic aspects, political control, peoples’ rights, the 
participation of affected interest groups, etc., are de-emphasized.  
The Regulatory State tends to favor regulation over other means of policy-making. It 
is more a rule-making state than a taxing and spending state. Market regulation is more 
important than the redistribution of income and macro-economic stabilization (Majone 
1997), the application of regulation is more formal, and privatization is a central feature 
(Levi-Faur and Gilad 2004). It involves a shift from direct to indirect government, and 
important policy-making powers are delegated to independent technocratic bodies with 
considerable political leeway, supposed to make objective decisions mainly based on 
professional competence. The state is kept at arm’s length from direct participation in 
the economy but has a well-developed regulatory role (MacGowan and Wallace 1996). 
In contrast to the traditional welfare-state model, which integrates regulatory, operating, 
and policy-making functions, the regulatory state separates regulatory activities from 
operational ones, purchasers from providers, and the policy-making role from the 
operational role. Greater emphasis is placed on single-purpose and non-overlapping 
organizations and monitoring by autonomous agencies (Boston et al. 1996). The 
regulatory state is, however, not a consistent concept. Such terms as «American 
Regulatory State,» a «European Regulatory State,» and a «British Regulatory State» 
(Moran 2002) all mean slightly different things.  
Regulation is also an ambiguous concept that can be used in both a broad and a 
narrow sense. We can distinguish between two different meanings of the term (Baldwin, 
Scott and Hood 1998, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). First, in the narrowest sense 
regulation means formulating authoritative sets of rules and setting up autonomous 
public agencies or other mechanisms for monitoring, scrutinizing, and promoting 
compliance with these rules. According to Selznick (1985) regulation is sustained and 
focused control by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community. The 
establishment of autonomous regulatory agencies brought about by the regulatory 
reform movement is connected to this narrow meaning of regulation. Public sector 
regulations imply that one agency seeks to shape the behavior of other organizations, 
that there is an arms-length relationship between the overseeing agency and the target 
organization and that the overseer has some formal authority or mandate for its 
oversight (Hood and Scott 2000). Second, regulation can be defined more broadly as all 
types of state intervention in the economy or the private sphere designed to steer them 
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and to realize public goals. This goes beyond rule-making to include areas like taxation, 
subsidies, and public ownership. In this sense regulation is an all-inclusive concept of 
governance.  
In this paper we are concerned primarily with the first, narrower definition of 
regulation − i.e., regulation as a) goal formulation, rule-making, and standard setting; b) 
monitoring, information-gathering, scrutiny, inspection, audit, and evaluation; and c) 
enforcement, behavior-modification, and the application of rewards and sanctions 
(Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 2001). These functions may be carried out by a single 
central public organization or else delegated separately to specialized agencies. Thus, the 
regulatory function may potentially involve a complex combination of vertical and 
horizontal inter-organizational specialization of the central administrative apparatus 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001). 
Regulation is normally considered to be regulation by the state which is in focus in 
this paper, but there is also a growing focus on private regulation of the public sector 
from outside (Scott 2002) and self-regulation inside government (Hood et al. 1999, James 
2000, Power 1997). One specific feature of regulation is that it is mainly an external 
form of control of formal organizations. The increase in formal autonomous 
organizations in the market, the civil society, and the public sector is said to have 
reduced the use and efficiency of traditional, informal, hands-on internal managerial and 
political forms of steering and produced a greater need for more formal and objective 
external control (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000). Privatization, liberalization, and 
deregulation have produced a larger number of autonomous formal organizations and 
this in turn increases the need for regulation and regulatory agencies. Regulation was 
originally directed towards formal organizations competing on the private market, but it 
continued to follow the market model when it was applied to civil society and the public 
sector. Our argument is that agencification and regulation go in tandem. Autonomous 
organizations need regulation, and regulation needs autonomous organizations. 
Likewise, devolution is coupled to re-regulation, i.e. political executives and ministries 
both let go and tighten the reins at the same time, something that makes organizational 
patterns more complex and effects more unpredictable.  
The heart of the regulatory state is the organization and regulation of the 
government apparatus (Moran 2002). Regulation can be carried out through a variety of 
bodies, such as parliaments, ministries, courts, local authorities, private-sector 
organizations, and international organizations. In this paper we will focus on central 
regulatory agencies. Not all agencies are regulatory agencies: some are primarily 
responsible for managerial tasks, while others provide services or offer policy advice. In 
fact, mixed or multi-functional roles were for a long time normal for many agencies in 
many countries (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b).  
Agencies have been described variously as non-departmental public bodies, hybrids, 
quangos, fringe bodies, non-majority institutions, quasi-autonomous public 
organizations, and distributed public governance (Greve, Flinders and van Thiel 1999, 
Flinders 2004). What an agency is and what it does vary considerably across national and 
organizational cultures, legal systems, and political systems (Smullen 2004). In this paper 
we will mainly use Pollitt and associates’ (Pollitt et al. 2004, Pollitt and Talbot 2004) 
rather narrow definition of an agency as a structurally disaggregated body, formally 
WORKING PAPER  6  –  2005 REGULATORY  REFORMS AND AGENCIFICATION 
10 
separated from the ministry, which carries out public tasks at a national level on a 
permanent basis, is staffed by public servants, is financed mainly by the state budget, 
and is subject to public legal procedures. Agencies have some autonomy from their 
respective ministry in policy decision-making and over personnel, finance, and 
managerial matters, but they are not totally independent, because political executives 
normally have ultimate political responsibility for their activities.  
In contrast to the former integrated model in which regulation was one of many 
tasks and a by-product of other relationships, the new regulatory model creates 
specialized agencies responsible for regulation and inspection. The modern agency 
model is thus different from the traditional model in that it combines expertise, 
autonomy, and specialization of tasks in a narrow range of policy issues (Majone 1997). 
There is separation both between agencies and ministries and between different agencies 
responsible for different tasks. This creates a lot of organizational complexity, 
potentially requiring more coordination (Gregory 2003). 
Regulatory agencies are a sub-group of central agencies and one of their main tasks is 
to control the power of the market, ensure fair competition, and protect consumers and 
citizens by guiding and implementing policy regulation. One of their features is that they 
often seem to be constitutional hybrids having both statutory power and incorporated 
status. These bodies carry out regulation using their own delegated regulatory power, 
resources, and responsibilities. They are neither directly elected by the people, nor 
directly managed by elected officials (Gilardi 2004, Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). 
Generally, regulatory agencies have more autonomy than agencies with managerial tasks, 
and are representing some kind of skepticism towards the direct involvement of political 
executives in regulation. 
In some countries, like the USA, all components of regulation, such as standard-
setting and rule-making, monitoring, enforcement, and the application of sanctions are 
delegated to regulatory agencies. The more normal situation, however, is that the 
different functions are split between different public organizations and different levels 
(Scott 2004). Goal formulation and rule-making are usually the task of supervisory 
bodies like ministries or legislative bodies, monitoring is concentrated in the agencies, 
complaints are handled by independent bodies, and the formal capacity to apply 
sanctions is reserved for the courts. In practice there is often some overlap in 
responsibility between agencies and superior organizations and also between agencies, 
such as when sectoral regulatory bodies clash with broader competition agencies.  
Structural changes, leading to the creation of agencies, and regulatory reforms, often 
go together. But it is also possible to have structural reorganization without changing 
the regulations and vice versa. Not all central agencies are regulatory agencies and not all 
regulation is conducted by agencies. 
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The Development of Regulatory Reform 
and the Agency Form 
In the late 1980s and 1990s there was a growing critique of state regulation both in the 
UK and the USA, partly connected to criticism of regulatory agencies (Baldwin 1997), 
and demands to roll back the regulatory state (Rose-Ackerman 1992). The focus of this 
criticism, which was accompanied by strong deregulatory rhetoric (Hutter 2001, Majone 
1989), was regulatory failure and regulatory crisis (Baldwin, Hood and Scott 1998). 
Paradoxically, however, during this period more new regulatory authorities were created 
around the world than ever before, suggesting a loose coupling between the actual or 
perceived functioning of agencies and the spread of the agency form. 
A common misconception is that quasi-autonomous agencies are a recent invention. 
In fact it would be more accurate to call them a reinvention. In some countries, like 
Sweden, agencies of this kind can be traced back 300 years, and in Norway they began 
to emerge from the 1850s onwards (Christensen 2003, Pierre 2004). What regulatory 
reforms have done is to change the role of traditional inspectorates and agencies 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). Agencies are rarely new in any absolute sense but are 
usually combinations of parts of or entire existing administrative bodies (Lægreid et al. 
2003, Carpenter 2005).  
Central agencies are key institutions in most developed countries (OECD 2002a). 
They are popular organizational forms in contemporary administrative reforms (James 
2003, van Thiel 2001, Barbieri 2004) and have expanded in number and importance 
over the past decades (Flinders 2004). One example is the British Next Steps program, 
which created more than 140 new semi-autonomous agencies. A study of regulatory 
agencies in six policy areas in 36 countries reveals that the number of regulatory 
agencies increased from 28 in 1986 to 164 in 2002 (Levi-Faur and Giald 2004, Jordana 
and Levi-Faur 2005). Autonomous regulatory agencies have been established in fields as 
diverse as telecommunications, railways, civil aviation, postal services, market 
competition, electricity, water, the media, the pharmaceuticals sector, the environment, 
food safety, data protection, occupational safety, homeland security, insurance, banking, 
education, and health care. In some countries, like Norway, the number of regulatory 
agencies has increased relative to other kinds of agencies (Rubecksen 2004). A 
comparative study of public management reforms reveals that the number of central 
agencies has grown in 10 of the 12 countries examined in Europe (Pollitt and Bouckaert  
2004) while the number of regulatory agencies has also increased in Eastern Europe, 
East Asia, Latin America, and in developing countries (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005, 
Pollitt and Talbot 2004).  
Some of these observed increases in regulatory agencies in many countries are 
probably due to labeling and re-labeling of activities and agencies that have existed for a 
long time. But there is little doubt that we are facing a ‘regulatory explosion’ and an 
epidemic of «agency fever» with quasi-autonomous regulatory agencies becoming 
accepted as ‘best practice’ all over the world and a policy fashion of our time (Pollitt et 
al. 1991, Levi-Faur, Jordana and Gilardi 2005). In contrast to the old integrated model in 
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which policy-making, regulation, and service-delivery were unified under ministerial 
control, the new single-purpose-organization model envisages specific organizations for 
specific tasks and activities. The willingness to delegate authority to non-majoritarian 
institutions, which fulfill public functions but are not directly accountable to voters or 
their representatives, seems to be increasing (Majone 1999).  
This does not, however, mean that all agencies are the same. A study of regulatory 
agencies in the telecommunications sector reveals significant differences in institutional 
design between different countries (Tenbücken and Schneider 2004). In spite of a clear 
trend towards regulatory policy convergence, national differences persist when it comes 
to institutional implementation of regulatory reforms. European regulatory pressure 
matters, but so do national administrative traditions (Bariberi 2004). The spread of the 
new regulatory paradigm has not lead to convergence in the organizational design of 
regulatory agencies. Tenbücken and Schneider (2004) label this parallel process of 
stability and change «divergent convergence.» 
In the last two decades liberalization has become a dominant political practice. This 
is especially evident within the area of public utilities, like telecommunications and 
power (Levi-Faur 2002). The long tradition of public ownership and direct ministerial 
scrutiny within integrated public organizations has come to an end or at least been 
pushed back. The new recipe is semi-independent regulatory agencies, which are 
supposed to have autonomy from both government and ministerial control and be 
independent from business and stakeholders; ambitions that may be difficult to fulfill.  
In the context of privatization and neo-liberalism, the increased focus on regulation 
represents a paradox (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Even as deregulation becomes a 
major trend, regulatory agencies with enhanced autonomy have been created in large 
numbers. Deregulation is often the first step towards re-regulation, but in a new form. 
Neo-liberalism promotes deregulation at the ideological level, but in practice it is 
accompanied by more regulation, probably showing a political reluctance to let go of 
control levers. The number of rules have not decreased but increased in the era of neo-
liberalism and there is a trajectory of «freer markets, more rules» (Vogel 1996, Ahrne 
and Brunsson 2004), reflecting an inconsistence among politicians concerning 
demanding a reduction of rules and producing new ones at the same time (Aberbach 
and Rockman 2000). This paradox is a central feature of regulatory reform (Majone 
1994).  
We also face a shift in the arguments for regulation—away from regulation that 
legitimizes state monopolies and towards regulation that enhances competition and the 
free market, thereby changing the content of regulatory policies. Regulation for 
competition has been upgraded to become the main regulatory technique. In addition to 
this often sector-specific regulation, there is also more general regulation of competition 
achieved by empowering the competition authorities and by introducing enforced self-
regulation in various areas. Deregulation and liberalization are followed by more rules 
and regulation, allowing growth of the regulatory state and public bureaucracies (Vogel 
1996). Regulatory reforms and liberalization often imply new forms of regulation rather 
than deregulation in practice. What is more, there has been an expansion in the scope 
for regulation from the economic sphere to the welfare state and social sphere. 
Summing up, in contrast to the deregulatory aspects of New Public Management, which 
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was supposed to roll back the state and give first priority to market interests, this trend 
has enhanced the growth of the Regulatory State.  
This trend should be qualified, however. Common problems do not necessarily lead 
to common responses (Hood et al. 2004). In other words, new forms of regulation do 
not necessarily replace older and more traditional forms. The balance between them 
change but old regulatory techniques do not disappear. The trend towards a Regulatory 
State is stronger in some sectors and policy areas, such as utilities, than in others like the 
welfare sectors, and there are great variations in how agencies operate, depending on 
what their primary task is (Pollitt et al. 2004). Variation also depends on the degree of 
regional integration, as exemplified by the European Union, and also on domestic 
political and administrative processes. How EU regulation is adopted in different 
countries depends on local political actors and processes (Kallestrup 2004). While 
European agencies may in general have less autonomy than American agencies and the 
system of public accountability may be less developed (Majone 1999), there are also big 
differences between how agencies function in different EU countries (Pollitt et al. 2004). 
Thus state traditions are important. The regulatory model, with its autonomous 
agencies, has been a main tool of governance in the USA for a long time (Eisner 1994). 
Regulatory agencies were created to remove regulation from direct political control and 
as an alternative to public ownership. Their autonomy, however, left them vulnerable to 
capture by the interests they were designed to regulate.  
The Regulatory State was for a long time an expression of «American 
exceptionalism.» This is no longer the case. Some scholars have revealed different 
trajectories in the USA and Europe, especially in the areas of public health, food safety, 
and environmental regulation. Regulatory issues were formerly more politically salient 
and civil interests more influential in the USA than in most European countries. In 
recent years this pattern has been reversed (Vogel 2003). This shift has to do with recent 
regulatory failures and stronger political support for more comprehensive regulatory 
standards in Europe as well as the increased regulatory competence of the EU (Wilson 
2003, Hellebø 2004). Since the mid-1980s regulatory reforms have become a central 
feature in the European Union as well as a main issue for the OECD.  
In the European context, the UK has also become a strong regulatory state (Moran 
2003). While the American Regulatory State was hierarchical, command-like, and 
concerned with the problem of capture, the British Regulatory State was more trust-
based, focusing on self-steering and self-regulation and a cooperative culture (Moran 
2002). The British Regulatory State has over the past decade moved towards more 
formalized, distrust-based auditing techniques and the establishment of many quasi-
autonomous Next Steps agencies.  
In other countries, like the Scandinavian welfare states, public ownership and 
nationalization were for a long time more popular policy tools than regulation. There is, 
however, also a long tradition of strong autonomous agencies being responsible for 
policy implementation and service delivery. In Sweden one concern is that the capacity 
of ministries to control and monitor the big and powerful agencies is weak (Molander et 
al. 2002), even though it can be argued that the cabinet has other, more general means 
of control that can counteract the formal autonomy of the agencies (Lindbom 1997). In 
Denmark and Norway the directors of the agencies are political accountable to the 
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ministries through the principle of ministerial responsibility, but there are regulatory 
reforms underway which might undermine this accountability, like preventing political 
executives from interfering in individual cases handled by the agencies or moving 
appeals or complaints out of the ministries to independent appeal boards (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2004b, Greve 2002). In Japan the regulatory system has been dominated by 
monolithic ministries in close and informal relationships with key businesses (Kagan 
2000, Scott 2004). Generally contextual factors such as state traditions, structures and 
reforms as well as political leadership make a difference (Thatcher 2002b). 
Even if the main trend is towards decentralization, delegation, and disintegration, 
there are also some examples of more centralization and integration in various 
countries, like the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security in the USA 
(Kettl 2004) and trends towards strengthening the center can also be observed in New 
Zealand, Canada, Australia and United Kingdom (Auchoin 2005, Gregory 2005, 
Halligan 2005, Richards and Smith 2005). Other initiatives, like the Norwegian hospital 
reform, have tried to combine centralization and decentralization or, like Norwegian 
immigration policy, have swung back and forth between autonomy and central control 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2003). 
Summing up these differences, the argument is that the Regulatory State and its 
distinct structural features are contingent on national settings, state traditions, and 
administrative cultures (jf. Christensen and Lægreid 2001). 
Effects, Implications, and Challenges 
When discussing the effects and implications of regulatory reform it is important to 
look not only at narrowly defined effects like efficiency and economy but also at the 
broader spectrum of effects, such as changes in accountability, legitimacy, and power 
relations. We still have a long way to go before we can draw any profound systematic 
and reliable conclusions about the effects and implications of the agency form and 
regulatory reforms. Reforms based on universal organizational templates and regulatory 
models that do not take the national context into account tend to create a need for new 
reforms rather than producing sustainable improvements (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). 
The effects of administrative reforms are often promised or assumed but seldom well 
documented (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Bouckaert and Peters 2004), but some 
relevant and important studies are emerging now. 
One comprehensive comparative study of agencies in the fields of prisons, 
meteorology, forestry, and social security in four EU countries concludes that the 
variation in agencies and the volatility in agency status and boundaries is such that the 
official practitioner’s ideal model is rare in reality (Pollitt et al. 2004). In addition, there is 
extensive national path dependency and great variation in activities according to how 
embedded they are in international networks and markets. Moreover, while performance 
indicators are widespread they are seldom used to clarify major trade-offs, and full-scale 
performance management is rare.  
One general lesson is that the division of tasks and responsibilities between 
ministries and agencies is much more complicated in practice than in theory. The 
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balance between policy areas, between specialized regulatory agencies and general 
regulators, and between administrative levels is unstable and varies both over time and 
between normal situations and crises (Christensen and Lægreid 2004a). The ambiguity 
of responsibility becomes especially clear when things go wrong (Gregory 1998, Bartle 
2005). Formal relationships that were supposed to become clearer in the new model 
turn out to be complex and disputable, with gray zones of authority. 
The balance between control and autonomy varies according to a number of factors, 
such as how extensive and radical devolution is, the base line, and various polity 
features, such as whether agencies are in a Westminster system or not. Political-
administrative culture and the stage of reform reached must also be taken into 
consideration (Yesilkagit 2004). Strategic constraints and control can mean different 
things in different countries, ranging from «hands-off» to relatively more «hands-on» 
activities by the political leadership. Normally there are overlaps in responsibility and 
there often exists a «discretion zone» or a «zone of indifference» in which regulatory 
agencies can operate in the shadow of political executives and make autonomous 
decisions. If they go beyond that zone, politicians might interfere and strengthen their 
control, so anticipated reactions also play a role. This means that the relationship 
between political and administrative executives might be expressed more in terms of 
ebb and flow than as a linear development towards less political control. That said, one 
main argument is that structural devolution changes and weakens the instruments of 
control and increases the distance between the political leadership and subordinate units 
and lower levels of management (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). The decision-making 
premises used by actors in autonomous agencies are less attentive to political signals 
than in an integrated model (Egeberg 2003). 
When regulatory agencies work well, they may enhance credibility and predictability 
and reduce the need for both political control and for the direct participation and 
involvement of citizens in the regulatory process. A high level of mutual trust may 
enhance this as well as a strong common culture (Boin 2001, Kaufman 1960). This is, 
however, not always the case and some of the main challenges in regulatory reforms are 
related to problems of implementation, coordination, accountability, de-politicization, 
legitimacy, and power. In the following, we will briefly address each of these issues. 
Implementation. It is not clear what the effects of the new regulatory system are in 
practice and one should be cautious about jumping to conclusions on the basis of 
formal and legal changes. For one thing, the implementation process may still involve 
negotiations, flexible cooperation and mutuality and informal control and steering, 
despite the more formal nature of the new regulatory regime (Hood et al. 1999, Lægreid, 
Roness and Rubecksen 2005b). The shortcomings or pathological aspects of regulation, 
such as «regulatory creep», «agency drift», information asymmetry, and biased 
bureaucratic behavior are well known (Sustein 1990, Gabrovski 1995, Hood et al. 2004). 
While the agency concept may occupy a dominant place in the rhetoric of reforms, it 
may in fact face significant challenges during the implementation process, which might 
be more incremental than radical, as exemplified by the cases of the USA and Canada 
(Graham and Roberts 2004). In practice regulatory reforms tend to run into problems 
of bureaucratic politics and institutional constraints during the implementation process 
(Lægreid and Serigstad 2004). 
WORKING PAPER  6  –  2005 REGULATORY  REFORMS AND AGENCIFICATION 
16 
In a study of the UK Next Steps agencies, James (2003) shows that civil servants 
shape their organizations into forms that yield them benefits and that agencification 
therefore fails to deliver lasting improvements in public service. The study did not show 
economic improvements, and efficiency and effectiveness were hampered by a lack of 
coordination. Moreover, the regulatory reforms used to control agencies at arm’s length 
from the ministries produced performance problems in some agencies. The use of 
performance targets in large agencies, like the Benefits Agency, had significant 
shortcomings when it came to broader efficiency and effectiveness issues (James 2000, 
2003). When practice is not consistent with the regulatory model, this does not 
necessarily imply that practice is wrong. Lack of correspondence may just as well be a 
problem of the model as an implementation problem. 
Coordination. The fragmentation of public administration by growth, disaggregation, 
structural devolution, and the establishment of single-purpose organizations might 
reduce central policy capacity (Christensen and Lægreid 2005) and increase coordination 
problems (Flinders 2004, Gregory 2003). The specialization involved in creating single-
purpose agencies tends to increase the difficulty of coordination and the capacity 
problems of political executives, because more issues and policy questions are channeled 
up to the ministries and the cabinet, instead of being weighed up and decided lower 
down in the hierarchy. This has been revealed in countries such as New Zealand, the 
UK, and The Netherlands (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The coordination problem has 
enhanced the need for «joined-up» government and «whole-of-government» strategies 
both vertically between ministries and agencies and horizontally between policy areas, 
especially in countries like the UK and New Zealand, which have been most radical in 
the NPM movement (Gregory 2003, James 2004, Pollitt 2003a). 
Accountability. A main concern arising from agencification and regulatory reforms is 
the problem of accountability (Scott 2000, Flinders 2004): how to make agencies 
independent and at the same time accountable both upwards to politicians, horizontally 
to other agencies and downwards to consumers and regulatees. The autonomy of 
regulatory agencies from government may lead to agency capture, creating a problem of 
democratic accountability; some scholars talk about an «accountability deficit» (Baldwin, 
Scott and Hood 1998). Moreover, in many cases the creation of regulatory agencies has 
not been followed by the establishment of parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms to allow 
parliament to effectively oversee autonomous agencies (OECD 2002b). 
A central accountability issue is how the relationship between government and 
regulators impinges on ministerial responsibility. It is generally accepted that ministries 
should be allowed to give some interpretative guidance to the regulators in how to carry 
out their function; however, this is expected to be general guidance and not directed at 
specific cases. One problem with such guidance is that it tends to be informal and not 
given publicly (Graham 1998). Another is that frame-steering often makes political 
executives feel they are losing control, since specific cases, in which they are not 
supposed to interfere, can have general implications (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). 
Regulation in Europe seems to be characterized by great discretion, weak accountability 
to parliament, weak judicial review, an absence of procedural safeguards, and 
insufficient public participation (Majone 1994), but also by variations according to 
territory, between states and between devolved governing systems. 
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Nevertheless, weaker upwards accountability to the parliament may be compensated 
for by stronger downwards accountability to consumers or citizens (Flinders 2004, 
Verhoest et al. 2005). Agencies are constrained by procedural and substantive rules that 
guide their discretion, and autonomy from direct political control does not mean 
immunity from public accountability (Majone 1999). Thus, responsiveness to users and 
clients might become a substitute for accountability in the control of autonomous 
central agencies (Bouckaert and Peters 2004). Accountability and transparency are not 
only about input and ministerial responsibility but should be seen in a wider context, 
which includes consumer sovereignty and the empowerment of citizens (Lodge 2004). 
Legitimacy. The emerging Regulatory State has been accused of lacking legitimacy and 
criticized for undermining political accountability, individual participation, and universal 
services (Lodge 2001). Indeed, weaker vertical accountability may produce a larger 
legitimacy gap. One prediction is that the Regulatory State, with autonomous agencies as 
its main organizational form, will represent a less positive state, encourage the hollowing 
out of the state (Weller et al. 1997), and weaken social goals. Others tend to view the 
emergence of a Regulatory State more benevolently as an open-ended project (Ayres 
and Braithwaite 1992, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). While the Regulatory State 
continues to steer, it leaves the rowing – i.e., such things as service-provision – to civil 
society or the market (Braithwaite 2000). The accountability challenge appears less 
threatening if one takes consumer sovereignty approach, which underlines the 
importance of individual choice. In addition, it may be argued that the delegation of 
regulation to non-elected decision-makers may prevent short-term political interference 
and produce more credible decisions (Majone 1999, Lodge 2001). To balance ‘input 
legitimacy’ focusing on fast, reliable technical information and ‘output legitimacy’ 
involving representative consultation with different stakeholders is however difficult for 
the regulatory agencies (Cohen 2005). 
The traditional standard of legitimacy within representative democracies is 
government by majority rule. In the Regulatory State this standard of legitimacy is 
supplemented by expertise and by a «Madisonian» model, which aims to share, disperse, 
delegate, and limit power by placing public authority in the hands of officials who have 
no direct or only weak accountability to either political majorities or minorities (Majone 
1997). A main challenge is how agency autonomy and democratic accountability can be 
made into complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than competing values.  
De-politicization. Behind the idea of establishing autonomous agencies lies the 
assumption that it is possible to separate politics from administration and to insulate 
certain decisions from political considerations. In practice this is difficult. It is necessary 
to distinguish between the de jure formal level of autonomy and de facto autonomy, which 
may vary according to contextual circumstances, such as political salience (Pollitt et al. 
2004), but also according to administrative culture, reputation, networks, and 
entrepreneurship (Carpenter 2001). Depending on what their issues and tasks are, 
agencies may enjoy more or less autonomy than is formally delegated to them. Thus, 
real agency autonomy might not correspond with formal agency autonomy (Yseilkagit 
2004). Politicians might use informal channels to influence the decision-making of 
agencies and thus undermining their formal autonomy, and there might also be 
situations of regulatory capture, in which those subject to regulation constrain the 
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autonomy of the agencies (Thatcher 2002a). Regulatory reforms and the creation of 
semi-autonomous agencies meant to weaken the role of political leaders may under 
specific conditions result in greater politicization (Peters and Pierre 2004). Politicians 
may interfere in if there is a power struggle between political executives and parliament, 
or if the media define an issue as a crisis (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). The problem 
of bureaucratic drift might occur, meaning that the agency succeeds in bringing about an 
outcome different to that preferred by the government or the parliament (Majone 2001, 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  
Although agencies may enjoy a high level of formal autonomy, under specific 
conditions politicians may attempt to curtail this autonomy. In addition, the general 
public, lobby groups, and media and interest organizations might also bring issues that 
are supposed to be apolitical onto the political agenda. Thus the process of 
agencification might be more a question of arena-shifting than de-politicization 
(Flinders 2004, Flinders and Buller 2005). Rather than fading away politics reemerges in 
other arenas. 
Power. Regulatory policy and the creation of autonomous agencies is not only a 
question of political and administrative efficiency but also of the redistribution of power 
within the polity. This development tends to strengthen administrative and technocratic 
bodies, public commercial units, experts, professionals, and bureaucrats and to weaken 
elected representative bodies and political executives. Some observers talk about the 
‘regulocrats’ as a new group of highly influential bureaucrats in the regulatory agencies 
enjoying a wide institutional autonomy (Levi-Faur, Jordana and Gilardi 2005). One 
observation is that power relations seem to be changing faster than accountability 
relations (Christensen and Lægreid 2003) The political leadership often finds itself in 
situations where it has responsibility without the corresponding power and control 
(Brunsson 1989), and seems to have trouble getting relevant information about the 
activities of subordinate organizational units and levels. Conversely, many of the 
autonomous agencies may gain more power without necessarily becoming more 
accountable. 
The regulatory policy that creates new autonomous agencies and empowers existing 
ones should not be regarded as an administrative technicality, but rather as a political 
reform involving a realignment of power relations (Flinders 2004). Regulation might 
also be seen as and attempt to compensate for the loss of control by central government 
brought about by structural devolution, privatization, and managerial autonomy. The 
price autonomous bodies have to pay for increased flexibility and discretion is a stronger 
regime of oversight, regulation, and performance assessment. 
Summing up, the issues raised by the Regulatory State are strongly interrelated and 
present some difficult challenges. One way to proceed is to try to gain a better 
understanding of the similarities and differences between regulatory agencies and other 
agencies, as well as of the roles of regulatory agencies in relation to other regulatory 
bodies. 
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Discussion and Theoretical 
Interpretation 
The rise of the Regulatory State is taking place in a variety of contexts and for a variety 
of reasons (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Three of the most prominent external forces 
driving the spread of the regulatory state are the neo-liberal New Public Management 
(NPM) movement, the EU, which has been strengthened as a regulatory entity, and the 
OECD as a promoter of regulatory reform.  
First, the rise of regulation as a mode of policy making is an off-shoot of the NPM 
reform trajectory and its focus on privatization, especially in the area of public utilities, 
and its emphasis on disaggregation and structural devolution within the public sector 
aimed at putting more distance between public agencies and politicians (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2004a). Since privatization is normally followed by new kinds of regulation to 
control the market and enhance competition (Levi-Faur 2005), the agencification of 
regulatory tasks is one of the key elements of NPM. Regulatory competence is delegated 
to agencies with weaker democratic accountability that are more insulated from political 
influence (Gilardi 2002). The best examples of this development are New Zealand’s 
creation of single-purpose organizations and the UK’s Next Steps program. However, 
many other countries have also launched autonomous regulatory agencies inspired by 
the NPM movement (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The reform path adopted by New 
Zealand from 1984 onwards, which actually went against the cultural traditions of the 
country, was prompted by both an economic crisis and a new political and economic 
ideology (Aberbach and Christensen 2001). 
A second important factor for understanding the rise of the Regulatory State in 
Europe is greater European integration and the emergence of the EU as a regulatory 
body focusing on competition and the development of a free internal market (Majone 
1994, 1999, Laffan 2001). Inspired by the American model, the European Regulatory 
State has both an ideological and instrumental background and culturally represents a 
new direction for many European countries. Regulation is the most important type of 
policy-making in the EU and inn the last decade the EU itself has been the subject of a 
variety of regulatory reforms affecting both its own regulatory regime and the member 
states (Armstrong 2000). Quite a few independent regulatory agencies have been 
established (Dehousse 1997, Flinders 2004). One difference between regulatory bodies 
at the national and the European level is that the latter also focus on regulation of the 
regulators (MacGowan and Wallace 1996, Zeiner 2003). The creation of the single 
European market required the liberalization of the utilities sectors, the abolition of 
national monopolies, and the establishment of independent regulatory agencies in the 
member states to promote competition. The EU as a new actor in regulation has 
affected the European regulatory style and brought it closer to that of the USA. This 
being said, there are also significant variation in regulatory adjustment both across policy 
areas and between countries (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002, Lægreid, Steinthorsson and 
Thorhallssson 2005, Ugland and Veggeland 2005). 
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A third central actor in the emergence of the Regulatory State is the OECD as a 
producer, certifier, and carrier of new reform ideas, prescriptions, and doctrines 
(Marcussen 2002, Sahlin-Andersson and Lerdell 1997). In 1995, the OECD launched a 
regulatory reform program in which the regulation of the market, competition policy, 
and the establishment of independent regulatory agencies were main components. It has 
assessed regulatory policy in all member countries with the aim of improving regulatory 
quality by fostering competition, efficiency, and performance. The concept of 
distributed public governance, produced by the OECD and used by the EU, refers to 
the emergence of quasi-independent non-majoritarian and non-governmental 
organizations (Flinders 2004, OECD 2002a). The doctrine is that regulatory agencies are 
most effective if they are independent from the ministry, operate according to a clear 
regulatory policy, and are staffed by experts (OECD 1995, 1997, 2002b). Thus, the so-
called evidence-based decision-making is to replace the informal, consensus-based 
approach to regulatory processes that was previously the normal policy style in countries 
like the Scandinavian (OECD 2003). 
Other international organizations important in the field of regulatory policy are the 
WTO (Veggeland 2004) and the World Bank, which have encouraged the creation of 
autonomous regulatory authorities and claim that formal oversight agencies are one of 
the critical success factors for civil service reforms (World Bank 1997, 1999).  
One can, however, question the reliability of the new regulatory orthodoxy coming 
from international organizations, using Norway as an example (Christensen and Lægreid 
2004b, Olsen 2004). The OECD acknowledged that the Nordic incremental, consensus-
oriented model of governance, emphasizing egalitarian values, a high level of mutual 
trust, solidarity, high standards of social welfare, an active intervening state, broad 
participation from affected interests, and a large public sector, had been successful and 
observed that regulatory agencies in Norway had emerged without experiencing any 
major crisis, had coped well with technical tasks, and demonstrated good regulatory 
practice and a capacity for adaptation. 
In spite of this positive assessment and the fact that Norway still performs very well 
today, the OECD suggested that Norway should abandon this governance model and 
«prepare for the future now» (OECD 2003) on the grounds that problems not present 
today would crop up in the future. It was more or less taken for granted, without any 
deeper analysis, that the existing, well-performing model should be replaced by the new 
one. What was not discussed was that such a change might well be at odds with 
traditional state norms and values and cause social conflict, thus reducing efficiency and 
effectiveness. The OECD’s attitude indicates that ideology and symbolism take 
precedence over the actual functioning of the traditional regulatory model (Olsen 2004). 
Thus we face a paradox: While evidence-based policy is a core element of the new 
OECD regulatory policy, the model itself seems not to be founded on evidence-based 
facts. The OECD’s arguments imply that reforms should be introduced in any 
governmental body, regardless of whether it functions well or not. The logic is that the 
existing model might potentially produce negative consequences in the future. But so 
might the new regulatory model. 
A rational-economic approach on the rise of the Regulatory State will tend to see these 
external pressures as functional, arising out of a need to increase credibility and reduce 
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political uncertainty. This approach is normative in the sense that it focus on agencies 
that ought to be designed in order to secure a degree of economic efficiency. According 
to public interest theory, a main reason for economic regulation is to correct market 
failures that prevent markets from operating in the public interest, such as externalities, 
market power, natural monopoly, and information problems (Breyer 1982, Noll 1989, 
Ogus 1994). Another reason is the protection of rights, often labeled social regulation, 
and pertains to such things as equity questions, the correction of past or possible future 
discrimination, and the protection of public interests in fields like health, safety, and the 
environment (MacGowan and Wallace 1996). A main concept in this perspective is that 
of common interests. Hence, regulatory rules are supposed to enhance justice and 
fairness (Baldwin and Cave 1999).  
In addition, regulation through independent agencies is perceived as the result of 
politicians’ attempts to enhance the credibility of regulatory policy and reduce political 
uncertainty (Gilardi 2004). This entails policy-makers signaling their credible 
commitment to the announced policy and avoiding inconsistent preferences over time 
(Kydland and Prescott 1977). Regulatory rules are formulated for the common good 
and regulatory reforms are brought about by central political executives acting on behalf 
of the general public with the aim of improving effectiveness, economy, and efficiency. 
Regulatory agencies are seen as a favorable organizational form because agencies can be 
insulated from immediate and partisan political pressures. The official model or the 
practitioner’s model of agencies is close to this kind of thinking (Pollitt et al. 2004). 
Disaggregating agencies from the ministries, giving them more autonomy and more 
responsibility for regulatory tasks, and holding them accountable for their performance 
is expected to improve efficiency and thus produce better regulation. The assumption is 
that the agency model has been chosen because it is the most efficient organizational 
form. 
Economic analysis focusing on self-interests and regulatory capture has played a key 
role in the development of regulatory policy (Ogus 2004). Economic theories of 
business regulations identify various forms of regulatory failure, often based on a 
rational choice approach (James 2000). This economic theory of regulation combines 
economic analysis with analysis of political behavior (Peltzman 1998), and it asserts that 
special interests and interest groups will try to pursue their own goals and influence the 
outcome of regulatory processes. A main focus is on power relations and self-interested 
economic and political competition for scarce resources. In one scenario, regulators 
might go ‘native’ and be captured by the interests they were designed to regulate, leading 
regulated organizations to lobby for regulation from which they will benefit (Stigler 
1971).  
Another scenario addresses what is sometimes called a bureau-shaping perspective 
(Dunleavy 1985), whereby in a regulatory state an increase in regulation might be 
explained in terms of the benefits bureaucrats expect to derive from devising new 
regulations (Majone 1994). One outcome might be that autonomous regulatory agencies 
begin to set their own standards rather than those formulated by the legislature and the 
political executive (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Thus the bureau-shaping model seems 
to have stronger explanatory power than the public interest model (James 2003). Third, 
a lack of cooperation between regulators and regulated organizations and the high 
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transaction costs ensuing from different institutional arrangements might make 
regulation too costly (Scholz 1991). This might in turn produce «agency drift» with high 
costs for monitoring, the application of sanctions, and enforcement (Lodge 2001). 
According to this way of thinking, regulatory rules are the result of a political contest 
between the different interests represented by politicians, agencies, and market actors. 
Its adherents are rather skeptical about the benefits to be derived from regulatory 
reforms and the establishment of autonomous agencies.  
In rational-economic terms the rise of the regulatory state can be seen as an apolitical 
pragmatic solution to problems such as lack of attention, time constraints, and lack of 
professional knowledge and expertise among political executives. Increased complexity 
of public policy reduces the effectiveness of the traditional command-and-control 
techniques. The argument is that delegating regulatory authority from politicians to 
experts will reduce decision-making costs and enhance efficiency and quality without 
having negative effects on other goals and values (Majone 2001). The delegation 
argument is an old one in the history of regulatory reforms (Bernstein 1955). There is a 
strong flavor of apolitical, de-political or technocratic attitudes behind these ideas. One 
example is the de-politicization of key regulatory activities such as central banking 
(Marcussen 2005). 
Using the economic variant of the rational approach the creation of regulatory 
agencies can also be seen as a question of political credibility (Majone 1999). Based on 
the idea of the primacy of business and markets over politics, the government delegates 
regulatory authority to experts and independent agencies at arm’s length from political 
executives to arbitrarily avoid short-term political interference and enhance the fairness 
and legitimacy of regulatory activities. The argument is that the body to which this 
authority is delegated should be independent in order to enhance the credibility of 
policy commitments (Majone 2001). The creation of autonomous agencies is justified by 
the perceived need to insulate certain activities from political influence. The prescription 
is that autonomous regulatory agencies can provide greater policy continuity, 
predictability, and consistency than cabinets and ministries because they are not 
dependent on electoral returns. The delegation of power to an independent agency is a 
way for central government to restrain themselves and to restrict their future freedom of 
action and also to reduce political uncertainty and opportunism.  
Another overlapping variant of the rational-economic perspective is the principal-
agent model, which has been a dominant approach to the study of politicians’ delegation 
of power to non-majoritarian agencies (Cohen and Thatcher 2005). Principal-agent 
theory has especially focused on formal institutional design of delegation and when and 
why political executives create agencies and transfer formal power to them. Agencies are 
supposed to deal with information asymmetries, handling blame and increasing 
creditability and efficiency. Principal-agency approaches also deals with the autonomy of 
agencies from political leaders. Agencies can act in contrast to the preferences of their 
political bosses (‘agency losses’) by following their own preferences (‘schrinking’) or 
because the agency has incentives to behave contrary to the wishes of the political 
agencies (‘slippage’) (Thatcher 2005). 
Rational-economic approaches has generally increased their popularity over the past 
decade, but has been concentrated on formal institutional design. There seems, 
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however, to be some indication that politicians have both credibility and political 
uncertainty in mind when they create regulatory agencies (Gilardi 2004). One study of 
agencies in The Netherlands shows, however, that the rational actor model has weak 
explanatory power (van Thiel 2001). There are also claims that the theory of 
bureaucratic capture has a weak empirical foundation (Frederickson and Smith 2003, 
Wood and Waterman 1994).  
It would be fair to say that the official model of agencies has had problems of 
fulfilling its promises. It is a special case that seems to work pretty well under specific 
conditions − namely, in situations with low political salience, where results and activities 
are easy to observe, when the tasks do not involve complex technology, when 
professionals and experts agree, when the risk is relatively low, when the financial 
resources involved are fairly modest, and when the policy does not involve 
redistribution issues. When these preconditions are not fulfilled, however, it tends to 
run into trouble (Pollitt 2003b). Other important factors are the degree of competition 
and the extent to which international markets, rules, and regulations are involved. The 
lesson is that context matters. Also the rational-instrumental approach is better to 
analyze the formal delegation than to analyze the actual practice and effects of non-
majoritarian agencies (Cohen and Thatcher 2005). In practice political executives often 
do not use their formal control over regulatory agencies, and agencies tend to develop 
close relationships, networks and mutual dependencies with each others and with 
regulatees (Cohen and Thachter 2005, Thachter 2005). 
Thus rational approach needs to be confronted by and supplemented with other 
theories that are more concerned with how to act in an uncertain, ambiguous, conflict-
ridden, and unstable world and that also pay more attention to the role of political and 
administrative executive leaders and the structural context in which they operate. 
A second way to understand the development towards the regulatory state is to see it 
from an organizational-structural approach in which the concept of bounded rationality is a 
main feature (March and Simon 1958, Simon 1957). It presupposes that decision-makers 
have limited time and attention. They face problems of capacity, understanding, and 
authority and therefore have to be selective in the decision-making premises they adopt 
and in how they distribute their attention. The formal organizational structure 
represents one important selection mechanism which includes some actors, problems, 
and solutions in public sector decision-making processes while others will be ignored or 
excluded (March and Olsen 1976). Gulick (1937) has stated some basic principles of 
public organizations that are relevant for our general understanding of the working of 
regulatory bodies. He argues that there is a rather close connection between stated 
public goals, the organizational structure chosen, and policy content, underlining that 
the way formal authority is distributed among hierarchical levels is important. In 
regulatory reform involving autonomous agencies this distribution is biased away from 
the top leaders. The formal levers of steering are weakened, the distance between levels 
increases, and political signals are generally weaker in independent bodies (Egeberg 
2003). Gulick may also provide insight into the horizontal specialization characteristic of 
regulatory reform through his four principles of specialization (Hammond 1990). The 
new regulatory model is mainly built on the process principle of specialization, de-
emphasizing specialization based on general purpose, clientele, or geography. 
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According to an organizational-structural approach, central actors in the field of 
regulatory policy act on behalf of formal public organizations. Their attitudes and 
actions and thus the content of the regulatory policy they formulate are formed by the 
organization they belong to and the organizational setting in which they operate. An 
organizational approach presumes that one has to study how the public sector is 
organized to understand the development of regulatory policy and its effects. It makes a 
difference whether the central governmental apparatus is an integrated system under 
ministerial responsibility or a more fragmented system of semi-autonomous organi-
zations (Christensen and Lægreid 2001); whether it is a parliamentary system or a 
checks-and-balances system; whether it is specialized according to function or according 
to geography; whether the state is a unitary or a federal one; whether private sector 
interests are integrated into regulatory decision-making processes or excluded; whether 
agencies have tight networks with multinational organizations or not; and whether 
specialization is more horizontal or more vertical. 
This way of thinking looks for structural features that will explain the variation in 
regulatory reforms and agency behavior and seeks to identify factors to explain the 
creation, maintenance, and performance of agencies (Pollitt et al. 2004). Formal 
structure makes a difference, but it is not the only factor that can explain variation. It is 
not enough to focus on the narrow internal governmental organizational structure 
alone, for the nature of tasks as well as external organizational connections and 
constraints also play an important role. Public sector organizations are political-
administrative actors embedded in a dynamic network of other public agencies, political 
executives, and private sector organizations (Christensen and Lægreid 2003, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004).  
From an organizational-structural perspective control via regulation may be seen as 
compensation for loss of traditional control by central government, owing to 
privatization, managerial autonomy, and delegation. It may also be seen as a blame-
avoidance strategy for politicians by shifting responsibility for policy failure to 
bureaucrats and experts (Majone 1999, Hood 2002), and indicate an instrumental 
conflict among actors with different interests. The autonomous agencies create a buffer 
zone that political executives can use to shift blame, whereby the politicians tend to 
delegate responsibility for failure but not for successes, and the agencies tend to accept 
responsibility for successes but not for failures.  
This perspective can also provide insights into regulatory reform and agencification 
and their effects. Political and administrative leaders are often central actors in the 
establishment of regulatory agencies, and they give various instrumental reasons for 
moving away from an integrated model. As shown, while some of the problems and 
solutions seem to be defined in real terms, others are more symbolic in character. This 
perspective offers insights into why the increased horizontal and particularly vertical 
inter-organizational specialization brought about by the establishment of regulatory 
agencies often leads to an undermining of political control (Christensen and Lægreid 
2004b). The instrumental effects of having a disintegrated model instead of an 
integrated one seem obvious, i.e., it is a considerable difference between having 
regulatory tasks integrated in a ministry or organized in regulatory agencies, and agencies 
have general great autonomy (Egeberg 2003, Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2005a). 
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A main lesson from this approach is that formal organizational structures are 
important in shaping organizational regulatory behavior and changing regulatory 
processes. At the same time, there is leeway within formal structures for some variation 
and for other behavioral logic to play an important role. Political and administrative 
leaders are important in shaping regulatory structures. They do not, however, only act 
on the basis of their hierarchical position but are also constrained by cultural traditions 
and environmental factors, elements we now turn to. 
The institutional perspective represents a third approach to understand the development 
towards a regulatory state. It challenges the hegemony of the rational reform and agency 
model (Brunsson and Olsen 1993) and it rejects the functional view of agencies 
underlying the rational approach. It is also skeptical about the explanatory relevance of 
the organizational-structural perspective (Selznick 1957). Ideas and culture are central 
features and can be located within organizations and administrative systems or in the 
environment. An institutional approach implies that regulation and changes in 
regulation are products of cultural traditions and path dependency, but also of symbols, 
organizational rituals, cultural constructions, taken-for-grantedness, interpretation, and 
rhetoric. (Hood et al. 1999).  
One variant of an institutional approach focuses on informal norms and values within 
agencies and political-administrative systems (Selznick 1957). Hence, institutional 
autonomy, organizational culture, and internal dynamics are important. Historical 
traditions and path dependency constrain what is appropriate and possible to transfer to 
agency status and to how agencies operate. The reform road chosen reflects the main 
features of national institutional processes, where institutional «roots» determine the 
path or «route» followed in a gradual adaptation to internal and external pressure 
(Krasner 1988, Pierson 2004). Change is characterized by historical inefficiency, 
incrementalism, and ‘revolution in slow motion.’ What happens in one country is not a 
blueprint for developments in other countries (Gains 2004, Prince 2000). Specific 
national policies and regulations for managing health, safety, and environmental risk 
continue to diverge (Vogel 2003). Regulatory reforms reinforce distinctive underlying 
national trajectories and historical legacies, and functional pressure highlighted by 
rational theory is mediated and constrained by cultural-contextual factors (Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet 2002). Countries such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands have 
undergone quite dramatic changes in their regulatory administration over the past 
decades, but these changes have occurred within distinct institutional paths or 
trajectories that dates back to a long national administrative and constitutional history 
(Christensen and Ysilkagit 2005). 
In some countries an administrative culture with well developed informal contacts 
and networks between ministries and agencies might undermine their autonomy and 
create stronger integration between ministry and agency than the formal model would 
lead one to expect, thus demonstrating the dynamic between structural and cultural 
factors (Christensen and Røvik 1999). One such example is Sweden, a country with a 
long tradition of independent agencies (Jacobsson 1984, Pierre 2004). This theory will 
predict diversity more than homogeneity in regulatory forms and agencies across 
countries, state traditions, and administrative cultures. It will also predict robustness, 
reluctance and path dependencies when it comes to implementing new regulatory 
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reforms, which seems to be the case in Norway (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 
2005b). 
As the cultural ideas of institutionalized organizations would suggest, the rise of 
regulation and the use of independent agencies is not only a product of neo-liberalism 
but is also connected to a decline in trust in political institutions (Hood et al. 1999, 
Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). The audit explosion, the general rise of regulation inside 
government, the development of performance-management systems, and the increasing 
number of autonomous regulatory agencies, not only in economic areas but also in core 
sectors of the welfare state like education, health care, safety and environmental issues, 
and consumer protection, can be seen as a response to this. The informal trust-based 
system founded on tacit agreements and peer control has been supplemented by more 
formal and distrust-based arrangements and command-and-control type regulation 
(Moran 2003). 
Another more social constructivist variant of this institutional approach focuses on 
external norms and different ways of constructing and interpreting regulatory reality 
(Morgan and Engwall 1999). Regulatory rules depend on the situation, the context, and 
the environment in which they are formulated. The general argument is that normative 
structures lead to symbolic diffusion and borrowing of the autonomous regulatory 
agency form. Governments act interdependently and look to other governments for 
inspiration. A regulatory agency can be created to enhance the legitimacy of a decision 
to privatize, by distracting attention from more substantive concerns (Meyer and Rowan 
1977).  
Institutional isomorphism can occur through coercive pressure – pressure from 
superior public organizations – normative pressure from professional networks, or 
mimetic pressure, whereby consulting firms and intergovernmental organizations offer 
organizational solutions that are said to decrease insecurity (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Autonomous regulatory agencies emerge because it is taken for granted that they are the 
most appropriate organizational form. The agency form is established simply because it 
has become the norm in our time. Thus, this organizational form spreads irrespective of 
its problem-solving capability. There is a tendency to follow fads, fashions, and 
dominant ideas, so that copying and diffusion are main mechanisms (Levi-Faur 2002) 
and institutional isomorphism can explain the development of the agency model in 
countries as the Netherlands (van Thiel 2001). Increased liberalization is perceived as 
inevitable – the deterministic TINA principle (There Is No Alternative) – and the 
choice for political leaders becomes more about when and under what conditions they 
should liberalize rather than whether they should do so at all. In addition, organizational 
forms tend to spread from country to country. Independent regulatory agencies have 
become institutionalized as part of the script about how the regulation of liberalized 
markets should be organized, as in the field of energy (Johansen et al. 2004). The 
regulatory agency has become a generally accepted recipe for organizing regulatory 
bodies in a rational and efficient manner.  
One way of seeing the rise of the Regulatory State and the spread of the agency form 
is as a diffusion process in which national governments respond to external symbolic 
pressure from the institutional environment, leading them to take for granted that 
regulatory agencies are an appropriate manner of organizing regulation (Sahlin-
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Andersson 2001, Gilardi 2003, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005). There is a diffusion of the 
regulatory agency form within sectors, across country borders, and within countries 
across sectors, whereby the first process seems to be faster than the last. There are 
endogenous sources of change, group processes and diffusion of best practices through 
policy networks, which create «world societies» of common understanding of what are 
appropriate problems and good solutions (Meyer et al. 1997). Thus, the great increase in 
regulatory agencies can be better explained by a constructivist approach than by a 
rational one. There seems to be strong element of symbolic diffusion of autonomous 
regulatory agencies, accompanied by imitation, preconceived notions, and a search for 
legitimacy (Gilardi 2003). That said, there are also elements of functional adaptation, 
implying that the need to improve credibility and decrease political uncertainty enhances 
the establishment of autonomous regulatory agencies.  
Generally, there is a growing empirical literature, focusing on diffusion, borrowing, 
and translation of organizational forms like the agency, but also on the importance of 
historical institutionalism, path dependency, and historical inefficiency as well as 
contextual factors related to tasks and contingencies. A comparative study of Britain, 
Germany, Ireland, and Sweden reveals a general shift towards the Regulatory State, but 
at the same time it is difficult to discern a convergence towards a single and identical 
regulatory approach in the different countries (Lodge 2001). A similar conclusion comes 
from a study of the UK, France, Spain, and Germany, which shows that different 
domestic institutional constellations, such as the degree of fragmentation, hierarchy, and 
policy overlap, tend to create their own logic and dynamic in the process of regulatory 
reform (Jordana and Sancho 2004). Domestic institutions and traditions represent 
«filters» producing different outcomes in different countries, as illustrated by Busch 
(2002) with respect to the regulation of the banking sector. Thus, there is limited 
evidence of the emergence of one regulatory state. 
This way of thinking can explain why the agency form is so popular and has spread 
so fast and so far. Nevertheless, there is said to be a loose coupling between talk, 
decisions, and actions in organizations and regulatory reforms (Brunsson 1989), 
meaning that this theory predicts a lot of superficial similarity in regulatory form without 
being very specific about what actually directs regulatory activities that are decoupled 
from the ideal type. 
A variant of this approach is the literature on translation, which argues that 
regulation is reshaped even as it spreads. It asserts that regulation is translated, edited, 
and modified locally and it takes issue with the idea of regulatory homogenization 
offered by the isomorphism approach. What are spread are not practice but 
standardized models and presentation of practice (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996, Sahlin-
Andersson 1996, Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002, Røvik 2002, Smullen 2004). The 
translation theory will predict a lot of diversity within a general trend towards 
agencification and a regulatory state.  
We argue that single-perspective studies have limitations and we therefore try to take 
a broader, more mixed approach that combines different perspectives. The complexity 
of the organizational context matters, task-specific factors are important, and much of 
what happens is the result of a blend of external pressure, path dependency, and choice 
(Olsen 1992). The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies in Europe seems to be a 
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mixture of top-down factor by domestic responses to national pressure from 
international sources such as EU bodies, bottom-up factors linked to credibility and 
political uncertainty and horizontal factors between counties through mechanisms such 
as taken-for-grantedness and symbolic imitation (Gilardi 2005) The agency form is a 
broad category that embraces quite a variety of ways of operating and of relationships 
with an agency’s parent ministry or other actors. The importance of the basic 
organizational structural form of the regulatory agency must be supplemented by other 
characteristics, such as the primary tasks enacted, political-administrative traditions, and 
culture, as well as external pressure, both economic and ideological (Lægreid, Roness 
and Rubecksen 2005a, 2005b). Such features constrain the scope for managerial 
strategies as well as political choice and design by executive political leaders (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2001, Pollitt et al. 2004). The logic of appropriateness and inefficient 
historical development must be taken into account and mixed with the logic of 
consequence (March and Olsen 1989, 1998).  
A main observation is that one cannot easily infer from regulatory programs and 
formal agency structure to practice, meaning that although some main effects are 
apparent, there is a lot of variation (Pollitt 2003b). The legal status and formal powers of 
the agencies represent broad categories that allow for differences in practice. There are 
variations in how the rules for control, instructions, and appeals are formulated for 
different agencies and how they are executed (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). Instead 
of deriving explanations based on one dominant logic, the challenge is to develop more 
complex propositions about how regulatory agencies are organized, how they work, and 
how they are transformed. 
Conclusion 
This review has shown that the development of the new regulatory agency model is 
much driven by international diffusion and isomorphism, with anti-political and 
symbolic overtones. When agencies are diffused rather than established for functional 
reasons, there is no reason to expect them to perform better or to represent rational 
adaptation. Under such conditions agency design might serve as regulatory ‘implants’ or 
‘regulatory triggers’ that will enhance divergence rather than convergence. Although it is 
possible to speak of a particular family of organizational forms, the model varies 
considerably both between countries and within the same country. This diversity is also 
affected by economic factors, the instrumental power relations surrounding political and 
administrative actors, and the national cultural context. Another main lesson from this 
review is that there is no best way to manage and control an agency and no one-factor 
explanations. In other words, there is no single best theory which can explain regulatory 
activity and agency behavior in all situations, everywhere, and at any time (Pollitt 2004). 
Regulation has a Janus face. On the one hand, democratic control has been 
challenged by the enhanced agency autonomy. On the other hand more formality and 
the drive explicitly to measure are driven by pressure for more open and transparent 
control. It is still unclear what kinds of interests and considerations are replacing 
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traditional political signals and discretion and how the trade-off between political 
control and agency autonomy will unfold over time. 
It is an open question whether more professional independence for experts in 
autonomous regulatory agencies will prevail or whether there will be a counter-wave of 
re-politicization. In recent years there has been a rediscovery of the historical-
institutional context (Olsen 2004). The need for a more profound understanding of the 
special situations of individual countries is now being underlined to a greater extent 
(World Bank 2000). Priorities have shifted from a drive to create autonomous agencies 
to a striving to find a better balance between accountability and autonomy. This 
involves focusing on weak co-ordination devices, lack of governing capacity, and weak 
accountability mechanisms (OECD 2002a). 
Based on the discussion in this paper, three suggestions for further research on 
regulatory reform and autonomous agencies are formulated. The first is to investigate 
the role of representative political bodies and political executives in the new Regulatory 
State. The changing relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and ways of 
balancing agency autonomy with political control are research issues that deserve greater 
attention (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b, Peters and Pierre 2001). In prescribing both 
enhanced autonomy and deregulation, and more control and re-regulation, regulatory 
reform perpetuates an enduring tension in the history of regulatory governance. The 
balance between autonomy and control is difficult to find and hard to maintain, and a 
main challenge is to clarify under what conditions the equilibrium tends to tip one way 
or the other.  
The second question, connected to the first, is how to regulate the regulators 
(Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2005b). Research on regulatory agencies to date has 
concentrated on regulatory and organizational efficiency and has not paid much 
attention to the issues of accountability and democratic oversight (Shapiro 1997, 
Flinders 2004, Majone 2001, 2002, Thatcher 2002a). Moving regulatory decision-making 
to autonomous agencies is not only about non-political technical and technocratic 
efficiency, but also involves sensitive political trade-offs and value-based choices 
involving such things as economic efficiency, safety, and security; social and 
environmental objectives like equity, fairness, and sustainability; political control and 
professional autonomy; and short-term competition and long-term investment in the 
infrastructure (Lodge 2004). Such trade-offs are often unstable and ambiguous and have 
clear political components that cannot easily be resolved using purely technical criteria 
(Jordana and Sanco 2004). It is necessary to bring politics back into our understanding 
of the logic of regulatory reforms and agencification (Jacob 2004), for these are not only 
about economic transaction costs, cost efficiency, and managerial rationality, but also 
about political transaction costs, political accountability, and political rationality (Ter 
Bogt 2003). Some of the rational-economic theories behind the new regulatory model 
seem to stem from ambiguous organizational thinking and also de-emphasize some of 
the potential tensions likely to arise between the different considerations (Boston et al. 
1996). 
Our third suggestion is to go beyond the rather state-centric approach to regulation 
research and to examine the issues from a transnational and multi-level perspective. The 
increasing importance of international organizations, non-governmental organizations 
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and supranational organizations and bodies like the WTO and the EU challenges the 
concept of the Regulatory State by blurring the boundaries of competence and adding 
new dimensions to regulatory policy. Regulation nowadays includes not only regulation 
by the state or within domestic government but also regulation by organizations outside 
the state. National administrations are highly integrated into the European regulatory 
system when it comes to rule making, implementation and enforcement (Lægreid, 
Steinthorsson and Thorhallsson 2005). The increased autonomization and Europeani-
zation of the regulatory agencies and the parallel development of autonomous 
regulatory agencies in the EU and in the member states might create a direct link 
between regulatory agencies at different levels, thus bypassing the domestic ministerial 
structure. It might enhance multiple identities and make the agencies double-hatted by 
enforcing EU laws in direct interaction with the European commission at the same time 
as they perform traditional regulatory tasks for domestic governments (Egeberg 2004, 
2005). Thus the new regulatory competition policy that promise decentralization might 
result in increased centralized power of the European Commission by developing 
professional networks and legal epistemic communities (Wilks 2005).  
One could also go beyond the transnational and multi-level perspective and open up 
for a more pluralistic governance approach in which the state is both a provider and an 
object for regulation, and including new forms of regulation such as enforced self-
regulation responsive regulation, soft regulation, transnational governance, and a new 
global order of regulatory capitalism (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Scott 2004, Mörth 
2004, Levi-Faur 2005, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2005, Braitwaite 2006). Such an 
approach would see the state and government agencies as one among many regulatory 
bodies and would include multiple actors such as non state actors and private regulation 
of public sector (Johnston and Searing 2003, Mattli and Büthe 2005). Regulatory 
capitalism implies increased privatization and delegation, development of new 
technologies and arrangements of regulation and empowerment of experts. This 
development in which regulation seems to be on the increase but not necessarily directly 
by the state, makes the challenges of implementation, accountability, legitimacy, de-
politicization, and power even more difficult to handle. 
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Malaysia and South Korea». September 2003. The Globalization Program. 
16‐2003 Dag Arne Christensen: «Active Ageing: Country Report Norway». November 2003. 
17‐2003 Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynspolitikk i Norge: Utflytting og autonomi». November 2003. 
18‐2003  Dag Arne Christensen, Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «The Impact of Institutional Legacies on 
Active Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
19‐2003  Ole  Frithjof Norheim  og  Benedicte  Carlsen:  «Legens  doble  rolle  som  advokat  og  portvakt  i  
Fastlegeordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering  i  legemiddelmarkedet. En 
prinsipiell diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy 
of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM.  
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23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power».  The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel: «Two Lectures: The Concept of Competence – an Instrument of Social and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
2002 
1‐2002  Håkon Høst:    «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:    «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og  Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen: «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk  analyse  av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
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24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
 
